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DISTORTING EXTORTION: HOW BRIBERY AND
EXTORTION BECAME ONE AND THE SAME
UNDER THE HOBBS ACT
Sigourney Haylock*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Ocasio v. United States,1 the Supreme Court grappled with the
issue of whether a public official can be found guilty of conspiring to
commit extortion under the Hobbs Act for agreeing to obtain money
from his co-conspirators.2 Perplexingly, the Court held that, indeed,
an extortionist is guilty of conspiring to commit Hobbs Act extortion
even if the person he extorts is a willing participant in the conspiracy.3
This Comment argues that Ocasio was wrongly decided based on a
blurred distinction between bribery and extortion. Sections II and III
of this Comment provide background by describing the facts of the
case and explaining the Court’s reasoning. Section IV puts Ocasio in
context by discussing the historical framework of the Hobbs Act.
Section V provides an analysis of the Court’s interpretation of the
plain language of the Hobbs Act, the distinction between bribery and
extortion, and how the Court’s holding perpetuates issues of state
sovereignty and prosecutorial overreach.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Samuel Ocasio, a former police officer, participated in a kickback
scheme in which he and other officers in the Baltimore Police
Department (“BPD”) directed damaged vehicles from accident scenes
to a repair shop called Majestic Auto Repair (“Majestic”) in exchange
for payments.4 Approximately sixty officers in the BPD sent damaged

* J.D. Candidate, May 2017, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., Environmental
Studies, 2012, University of California, Santa Barbara.
1. 136 S. Ct. 1423 (2016).
2. Id. at 1429.
3. Id. at 1427.
4. Id. at 1427.
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cars to Majestic in exchange for $150 to $300 per referral. 5 Before
sending a car to Majestic, Ocasio would call the shop owners from the
accident scene to verify the make and model of the car, the damage,
and the car’s insurance coverage in order to ensure profitability. 6
Ocasio participated in the scheme from 2009 to 2011,7 and by early
2011 nearly ninety percent of Majestic’s customers came directly from
officers at the BPD.8 Later that year, the shop owners, Ocasio, and
nine other police officers were indicted on charges of Hobbs Act
extortion and conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act extortion.9
Ocasio challenged the conspiracy conviction, arguing that he
could not be convicted of conspiring with the shop owners to extort
money from the very same shop owners.10 He requested a jury
instruction that stated, “[i]n order to convict a defendant of conspiracy
to commit extortion under color of official right, the government must
prove . . . that the conspiracy was to obtain money or property from
some person who was not a member of the conspiracy.”11 The trial
court refused to give the proposed instruction.12
Ultimately, the District Court for the District of Maryland
convicted Ocasio of Hobbs Act extortion and conspiracy to commit
Hobbs Act extortion13 and the Fourth Circuit affirmed.14 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari and likewise affirmed Ocasio’s conviction.15
III. REASONING OF THE COURT
Ocasio was convicted under the general federal conspiracy
statute, which makes it a crime to “conspire . . . to commit any offense
against the United States.”16 The Court defined the underlying offense
as extortion under the Hobbs Act, which prohibits the “obtaining of
property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of
actual or threatened force, violence or fear, or under color of official
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1428.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1429.
11. Id. at 1428.
12. Id.
13. United States v. Ocasio, No. CCB-1-11-CR-00122-013, 2012 WL 12092056, at *1
(D. Md. July 23, 2012).
14. United States v. Ocasio, 750 F.3d 399, 401 (4th Cir. 2014).
15. Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1423.
16. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012).
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right.”17 The phrase “under color of official right” refers to a public
official or employee who uses the power and authority of his or her
office to obtain money, property, or something of value to which he or
she has no official right from another.18
The Court relied heavily on an in-depth analysis of traditional
conspiracy law, perhaps at the expense of a thorough analysis of the
distinction between extortion and bribery. According to the Court, in
order to establish Ocasio’s Hobbs Act conspiracy, the Government
only needed to prove that there was an agreement for any one of the
conspirators to commit each element of the substantive offense. 19 In
other words, a conspirator simply had to agree that the underlying
offense be committed by at least one member of the conspiracy
capable of committing it.20
Ocasio’s main argument was that the shop owners could not be
members of a conspiracy to commit extortion when they willingly
consented to pay the officers in exchange for referrals. 21 He argued
that this was not extortion, but rather bribery.22 The Court disagreed,
holding that, although they could not extort themselves, the shop
owners were capable of conspiring with the officers to be extorted.23
The Court found that the elements of the conspiracy were satisfied
because the officers were capable of extorting “another,” even though
the other party was a part of the conspiracy.24
The Court based its reasoning on cases involving the Mann Act,25
which makes it a crime to transport a woman or cause her to be
transported across state lines for an immoral purpose.26 For example,
the Court discussed United States v. Holte27 in which a woman was
charged for conspiring with a man to transport herself across state
lines.28 The trial court dismissed the charge holding that, because a
woman could not be convicted for the substantive offense of
17. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012).
18. KEVIN F. O’MALLEY ET. AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS CRIMINAL
§ 53:09 (6th ed. 2015).
19. Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1429.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1433–34.
22. Id. at 1434.
23. Id. at 1432.
24. Id.
25. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421–24 (2015).
26. Id.; Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1430.
27. 236 U.S. 140 (1915).
28. Id. at 140.
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transporting herself or causing herself to be transported across state
lines, she also could not be convicted of conspiring to commit the
offense.29 The Supreme Court rejected that holding, stating that “a
person may conspire for the commission of a crime by a third person,”
even if “she could not commit the substantive crime” herself.30
Similarly, in Gebardi v. United States,31 a man and woman were
convicted of conspiring to transport the woman from one state to
another for an immoral purpose.32 The Supreme Court stated that
“[i]ncapacity of one to commit the substantive offense does not
necessarily imply that he may with impunity conspire with others who
are able to commit it.”33 Like in Holte, the Court agreed that a woman
could be convicted of conspiring to cause herself to be transported
across state lines.34 However, in Gebardi the woman’s “mere consent”
or “acquiescence” was not enough to support the conspiracy
convictions because she was not “the active or moving spirit in
conceiving or carrying out the transportation.”35 These cases show that
one can be guilty of conspiring to commit a crime even when they are
incapable of actually committing the crime.
Applying this reasoning to Ocasio, the Court held that, even
though the shop owners could not commit each element of the offense
on their own, the elements of the crime were satisfied because the shop
owners shared the common purpose that the officers would obtain
money from another under color of official right.36 The Court reasoned
that if a woman can conspire to transport herself, then conspirators can
conspire to extort themselves.37 Although the shop owners were
incapable of extorting themselves on their own, they were capable of
conspiring with others to be extorted.38 Based on this reasoning, the
Supreme Court rejected Ocasio’s arguments and affirmed his
conviction.39

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 141.
Id. at 144–45.
287 U.S. 112 (1932).
Id. at 115–16.
Id. at 120.
Id. at 116–17.
Id. at 119.
Ocasio v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1423, 1433 (2016).
See id. at 1431–32.
Id. at 1433–34.
Id. at 1437.
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IV. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK
A. The Hobbs Act
The Hobbs Act was enacted in 1946 to help the government
combat racketeering associated with organized crime.40 The Act
prohibits actual or attempted robbery, extortion, or conspiracy that
affects interstate commerce.41 As noted above, it defines extortion as,
“the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by
wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under
color of official right.”42 Victims of extortion must be induced by a
belief that the defendant has the power to harm them or cause
economic loss.43 The crux of the offense is a subjective fear of loss by
the victim.44
While this is the traditional understanding of extortion, the
Supreme Court has since expanded the meaning of Hobbs Act
extortion to include bribery.
B. Equating Extortion with Bribery
The language of the Hobbs Act plainly lacks the term bribery.45
However, the Court in Evans v. United States46 held that extortion by
a public official was “the rough equivalent” of “taking a bribe.”47 In
Evans, a county commissioner was convicted of extortion under color
of official right for accepting money in exchange for a favorable
zoning decision.48 The Court held that it was enough that a public
official had accepted a payment knowing that it was given in exchange
for some exercise of official power,49 and Evans’s conviction for
Hobbs Act extortion was affirmed.50 The Court in Evans decided that
40. United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 377 (1978).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012); United States v. Baylor, 517 F.3d 899, 903 (6th Cir. 2008).
42. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012).
43. See, e.g., United States v. Capo, 817 F.2d 947, 954 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that the
evidence was insufficient for a finding of Hobbs Act extortion where the “victims” were not
coerced or threatened by defendants and did not reasonably fear economic loss).
44. Extortion is based on the wrongful use of an otherwise valid power. United States v. Hyde,
448 F.2d 815, 833 (5th Cir. 1971). If the power is used to intimidate and force others to pay, the
action is extortion. Id.
45. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012).
46. 504 U.S. 255 (1992).
47. Id. at 260.
48. Id. at 296 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 268.
50. Id. at 255.
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even “passive acceptance” of a bribe by a public official can violate
the Hobbs Act and eliminated the inducement element of extortion.51
Other cases have similarly held that bribery and extortion are not
mutually exclusive.52
Prior to Evans, federal prosecutors were unable to reach state and
local officials through the federal bribery statute.53 Since the Court
equated extortion with bribery,54 state officials who accept bribes can
be charged with federal extortion under color of official right even if
the briber is a co-conspirator that was in no way induced by a
subjective fear of loss.55 Evans paved the way for the holding in
Ocasio by incorrectly equating extortion with bribery.
V. ANALYSIS
The plain language of the Hobbs Act does not indicate that
Congress intended to punish the type of agreement made between
Ocasio and the shop owners for two main reasons.56 First, the officers
did not obtain property from “another.” Rather, they agreed to an
exchange of money and favors amongst themselves. Second, the
officers did not use force or wrongfully use color of official right to
induce or initiate an exchange of property. Instead, the shop owners
willingly agreed to enter into a mutual agreement with the officers.
51. Id. at 258–59.
52. Many courts have convicted public officials of Hobbs Act extortion in the absence of any
inducement on the part of the public official or fear on the part of the alleged victim. See, e.g.,
United States v. Stephenson, 895 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding Hobbs Act extortion where an
official in the Department of Commerce accepted payments to influence a ruling); United States v.
Spitler, 800 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1986) (finding Hobbs Act extortion where a state highway
administrator accepted money from a road building contractor in exchange for favors); United
States v. Wright, 797 F.2d 245 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1013 (1987) (finding Hobbs
Act extortion where city prosecutors accepted money for not prosecuting drunk drivers).
53. The federal bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2012), generally applies only to federal public
officials; federal prosecutors pursuing bribery on the state and local level must use a different
theory. Randall Eliason, Ocasio v. United States: The Supreme Court Confronts the Blurred Line
between Bribery and Extortion, SIDEBARS, (Oct. 19, 2015) https://rdeliason.com/20
15/10/19/ocasio-supreme-court-bribery-extortion-hobbs.
54. Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1437 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
55. Rory Little, Opinion Analysis: Federal Conspiracy Law Reaches Persons Who Agree to
Obtain Secret Kickbacks from a Member of the Conspiracy, SCOTUSBLOG (May 2, 2016,
5:33 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/05/opinion-analysis-federal-conspiracy-law-reachespersons-who-agree-to-obtain-secret-kickbacks-from-a-member-of-the-conspiracy.
56. The statute plainly discusses robbery and extortion, but does not include bribery. If
Congress intended to include bribery of a public official in the Hobbs Act, then it would have done
so. For example, in the Travel Act, Congress explicitly criminalized state and local “extortion,
bribery, [and] arson.” 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2012). Congress tellingly left bribery out of the Hobbs
Act.
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These two arguments are discussed in turn below. They are followed
by an analysis of the implications of the holding in Ocasio as it
pertains to state sovereignty and prosecutorial overreach.
A. Defining “Another”
The plain language of the Hobbs Act requires that property be
taken from “another,” not from someone within the conspiracy.57 Yet,
the Government argued, and the Court agreed, that a conspiracy to
obtain property from another includes an agreement between two
parties to exchange property between themselves.58 This unnatural
reading of the Hobbs Act adds to the blurring of the distinction
between extortion and bribery.
The majority largely based its reasoning on an analysis of the
Mann Act.59 However, as Justice Sotomayor noted in her dissent, the
language of the Mann Act does not compare to the language in the
Hobbs Act.60 Unlike the Hobbs Act, which requires “another” person,
the Mann Act pertains to the transportation of “any woman.”61 A
conspiracy to agree to transport “any woman,” in violation of the
Mann Act, naturally includes any woman who is a part of the
conspiracy.62 The same cannot be said of the Hobbs Act’s specific
requirement that the conspirators as a whole agree to obtain property
from “another.”63
Justice Sotomayor further explained that “any” is not a relational
word that requires a determination of who is in a group and who is not,
whereas the term “another” does.64 “Another” describes how one
entity is connected to a different entity that must be “different or
distinct from the one first considered.”65 A conspiracy is “a
partnership in crime,” so the law treats a conspiracy as one distinct
entity.66 As a whole, the conspirators must seek to obtain property
from a distinct entity to satisfy the meaning of “another.”67 Simply
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012).
See Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1426.
Id. at 1442–43 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1443.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1441; Another, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003).
Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1441–42 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1442.
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stated, at least one member of the group must seek to obtain property
from someone who is not a part of the group.68
Applying this understanding of the Hobbs Act, the Sixth Circuit
in United States v. Brock69 held that “three people did not agree, and
could not have agreed, to obtain property from ‘another’ when no
other person was involved.”70 In Brock, the defendants were also
convicted of conspiring to commit Hobbs Act extortion where the
underlying conduct was more akin to bribery.71 The Sixth Circuit held
that the person paying a bribe to a state official could not conspire with
that official to extort property from himself in violation of the Hobbs
Act.72 This is the most logical application of the plain language in the
act, yet the Supreme Court, consistent with the reasoning in Evans,
abrogated Brock.73
Similar to the conspirators in Brock, the conspirators in Ocasio
agreed that the officers would take property from people who were
part of the conspiracy.74 There is no question that the shop owners in
Ocasio were conspirators involved in the scheme as opposed to
“another” being extorted by the officers. Although the law treats a
conspiracy as one distinct entity, the Supreme Court decided that
“another” could be determined from the perspective of each individual
within the conspiracy.75 This means that any one conspirator can be
considered “another” despite being a part of the very same conspiracy.
This interpretation of the language in the Hobbs Act has resulted in
illogical holdings such as the one in Ocasio and will continue to do so
until Evans is overturned.
B. Distorting Extortion
The Court has unilaterally read bribery into the meaning of the
Hobbs Act. Bribery and extortion are distinct crimes and the
majority’s decision in Ocasio perpetuates the elimination of the
distinction under the Hobbs Act.76 The main difference between

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
501 F.3d 762 (6th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 767.
Id.
Id. at 764.
Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1423.
Id.
Id. at 1442 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1439 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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bribery and extortion is the role of each party. Extortion requires
initiative or purpose on the part of the public official and fear or lack
of voluntariness from the victim.77 With extortion, the public official
is the only offender and the payor is an innocent victim.78 The person
who pays the public official is not considered a willing participant of
a corrupt deal.79 On the other hand, with bribery, the public official
does not need to feign a right or entitlement because the payor knows
the official is not entitled to the payment.80 With a bribe, both sides of
the transaction are guilty parties to a corrupt deal.81
This distinction is problematic because the Hobbs Act does not
prohibit a victim’s payment of extortion; it only punishes the public
official.82 By equating extortion with bribery, the Court in Evans
created a prohibition on bribery, a crime involving two guilty parties,
based on a portion of a statute that only punishes the public official.83
The Supreme Court has essentially carved out an exception that allows
federal prosecutors to charge state and local officials with conspiracy
to commit Hobbs Act extortion in the absence of any actual
extortion.84
In Ocasio, the owners of Majestic were not victims. Not only
were they complicit in the scheme, they greatly benefited from it as
ninety percent of Majestic’s business came directly from police
referrals.85 The agreement was mutually beneficial and collaborative
with no inducement or fear.86 As such, Ocasio was not guilty of
conspiring to commit extortion; rather, he was guilty of conspiring to
engage in bribery, which the Hobbs Act does not explicitly target.
Conspiracy has been criticized as a “vague and elastic” charge
that fits a prosecutor’s needs in any given case.87 The Court has
77. United States v. Hyde, 448 F.2d 815, 833 (5th Cir. 1971).
78. Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1438 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
79. Randall Eliason, Extortion Distortion: Ocasio v. United States, SIDEBARS (May 12, 2016),
https://rdeliason.com/2016/05/12/extortion-distortion-supreme-court-hobbs-ocasio-v-unitedstates.
80. Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1438 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
81. Eliason, supra note 79.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 618 F.2d 411, 419 (6th Cir. 1980) (finding Hobbs Act
extortion where appellants were passive recipients of bribes with no inducement or initiation of
transfer of payment).
85. Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1438–39.
86. Id. at 1427.
87. Id. at 1445–46 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Krulewitch v. United States,
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cautioned that it “will view with disfavor attempts to broaden the
already pervasive and wide-sweeping nets of conspiracy
prosecutions.”88 Yet, it failed to do so in Ocasio.
To the extent the Court relied on traditional conspiracy law, it was
correct in concluding that Ocasio entered into a conspiracy to commit
a crime. However, the underlying crime was not extortion. The Court
thoroughly analyzed traditional conspiracy law and failed to
adequately address the distinction between extortion and bribery.
Instead, it relied on its flawed reasoning in Evans, which has resulted
in the notion that public officials “exude an aura of coercion at all
places and at all times,” simply by virtue of their title.89
The Court could have used the general principles of conspiracy
law to come to the correct conclusion if Ocasio had been charged with
conspiracy to commit the proper underlying crime. There are other
criminal statutes that reach the conduct at issue here.90 Hobbs Act
extortion is meant to prohibit public officials from obtaining property
from others by extorting them. While bribery is certainly prohibited
by law, the Hobbs Act is not the proper avenue by which to pursue
such charges. Under the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Hobbs
Act, state and local officials can be convicted of Hobbs Act extortion
with the potential for a twenty-year prison sentence for taking a bribe.
C. Prosecutorial Overreach
The Hobbs Act provides an avenue for the expansion of federal
criminal jurisdiction into a field traditionally left to state and local
laws.91 The Court briefly noted that Ocasio’s invocation of principles
of federalism was unavailing, yet it did not cite any authority justifying
the intrusion on state bribery laws.92 The holding in Ocasio challenges
state sovereignty and encourages federal prosecutorial overreach.
The Supreme Court has stated, “[u]nless Congress conveys its
purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly changed

336 U.S. 440, 445–57 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
88. Id. at 1445 (citing Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 404 (1957)).
89. Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 290 (1992).
90. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2012) (criminalizing bribery of state, local, or tribal officials in
specified circumstances); MD. CODE. ANN., CRIM. LAW § 9-201 (West 2012) (criminalizing
bribery of public employees).
91. Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1434.
92. Id.
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the federal-state balance in the prosecution of crimes.”93 Congress
failed to make its intent for federal prosecutors to regulate bribery by
state and local officials “unmistakably clear in the language of the”
Hobbs Act.94 Instead, Congress’s intention was arguably the opposite,
as it did not include bribery in the statute.95 When Congress wants to
criminalize state and local bribery, it knows how to do so.96 If
Congress intended to criminalize parties to a bribe under the Hobbs
Act, then it would have done so explicitly.97
The lack of congressional intent is further evidenced by the fact
that the federal bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201, only applies a twoyear penalty for bribery committed by federal officials 98 while the
Hobbs Act carries a significantly higher twenty-year penalty.99 It is
unlikely that Congress intended for such a heavy penalty to apply to
state and local bribery when it only included a two-year penalty for
the same offense by federal officials.100 It is likely that Congress
intended for extortion to carry a heavy penalty because of the severity
of the conduct involved. On the other hand, bribery, while warranting
culpability, does not rise to the level of extortion and should not carry
the same penalty.
The Court’s failure to heed Congress’s intent has allowed for
federal prosecutorial overreach.101 Federal prosecutors consistently
seek to prosecute state and local corruption,102 but they are rightfully
93. Id. at 1439 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 858
(2000)).
94. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991).
95. Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1439 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
96. Both 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2012) and 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2012) explicitly criminalize state and
local bribery. On the other hand, 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2012) specifically applies only to federal public
officials. As such, Congress knew exactly how to criminalize state and local bribery if it so
intended.
97. Compare the language of 18 U.S.C. § 872, which criminalizes extortion by the federal
official, but not the payor, with 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2012), which criminalizes both parties to a bribe
involving a public official. Evans, 504 U.S. at 283–84 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
98. Charles N. Whitaker, Note, Federal Prosecution of State and Local Bribery:
Inappropriate Tools and the Need for a Structured Approach, 78 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1617 (1992).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Congress, of course, could step in and amend the Hobbs Act or enact a federal statute that
specifically targets state and local bribery to resolve the misinterpretation. See e.g., Eliason, supra
note 79.
102. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE ACTIVITIES AND OPERATION
OF THE PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION FOR 2014 at 16 (2014), https://www.justice.gov/criminal/file/
798261/download (listing several cases outlining federal prosecution of state and local officials for
corruption crimes).
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subject to statutory constraints.103 The Court in Evans interpreted the
Hobbs Act to allow prosecutors to bypass such constraints and
prosecute conduct not explicitly proscribed by statute. With renewed
support from Ocasio, federal prosecutors will undoubtedly continue to
charge state and local officials in a manner that is inconsistent with a
plain reading of the Hobbs Act.
VI. CONCLUSION
It was unnecessary for the Supreme Court to expand the reach of
federal prosecutors by interposing bribery into the Hobbs Act. Surely
Congress would have expressly included bribery in the language of
the act if that were the conduct it sought to punish. However, the
Supreme Court interpreted the Hobbs Act to include bribery and it has
not faltered in its interpretation. Unfortunately for potential petitioners
seeking to overturn Evans, the Court seems to have dug its heels in
with Ocasio. The number of Supreme Court Justices who are likely to
get on board with a re-examination of the holding in Evans, likely
including Justice Thomas and Justice Breyer, is simply too small to be
effective at this time. It is also unlikely that Congress will step in to
resolve the misinterpretation in light of the almost twenty-five years
of radio silence since Evans was decided.
As evidenced by Ocasio, the Hobbs Act will continue to function
as a powerful tool that allows federal prosecutors to charge federal and
state officials, not only with the crimes listed in the statute, but also
with a crime that has since become roughly equivalent.

103. Brief for Former United States Attorneys as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 6,
Ocasio v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1423 (2016) (No. 14-361).

